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Due to intensive conflict, a significant amount of Syrian capital flight has funnelled to
Turkey since 2011. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted in five major Turkish cities which
have hosted the highest number of Syrian business people, this paper first reveals the
convergence of the interests of the host state and of the displaced capital owners, as well
as the increasing transnationalisation of Syrian economic practices. It then assesses the
capacity and/or willingness of the Syrian business people to organize themselves as an
interest group regarding their interests in Turkey and to assist the process of conflict
resolution in Syria. Finally, the paper reflects upon whether a hybrid identity is in the
making within the Syrian business diaspora in Turkey. Our findings suggest that the
Syrian business diaspora in Turkey is evolving itself into a transnational business
community, and developing hybrid socio-economic practices. Yet, we delineate this
flourishing community as ‘shy’ because the issues concerning both domestic and Syrian
politics are carefully being avoided to keep stability and unity within. This consequently
hinders the Syrian business community to form itself as an interest group in Turkey
focused on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Syria.
Keywords: Syrian Business Diaspora, capital flight, Turkey, transnationalism, conflict
resolution, shy diaspora, hybridity
Introduction
The Syrian conflict has had a profound impact on the business community in
Syria. According to the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR 2015: 28), both public
and private investment dropped to 9.2 per cent of the GDP in 2015. The long-continued
war led to widespread closure and bankruptcy, and many businesses experienced a sharp
decline in production due to the sanctions imposed by the United States, the European
Union and the League of Arab States (Abboud 2012). In 2013, profit losses of six of
Syria’s fourteen private banks were between forty to ninety-five per cent (Abboud 2013).
Some businesses on the other hand, adapted to crisis situation and relocated their
enterprises within Syria from the conflict zones to the “safe areas” in the Mediterranean
coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus with the encouragement of the regime. According to
the Syrian Chambers of Industry, 109 factories relocated their operation in Syria in 2013
2and 2014 (Ahmed 2015). Private investment in the regime-controlled areas, however, was
badly affected by the government policy of price liberalization which increased the
economic cost, deteriorated effective demand, and caused foreign exchange rate
depreciation and volatility (SCPR 2015:28).
Syria’s business community has also been deeply affected by the emergence of
the war economy. A new group of businessmen emerged who exploited wartime
opportunities by engaging in intermediary activities for the Syrian regime to circumvent
sanctions, and/or the smuggling of weapons, goods, and people. The rise of new
economic actors in the thriving war economy has further fractured business community,
and has obscured business class’ stance in post-conflict context of Syria. Thousands of
Syrian businessmen have hence decided to leave ‘the regime or the regime’s cronies’ and
move to the neighbouring countries (most notably, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, UAE and
Egypt), mainly due to the security, political, and economic concerns (Chang 2015: 2).
Capital flight constitutes therefore one of the most important dimensions of the Syrian
war with its considerable impact on the current course of the conflict and post-conflict
process in Syria.
Due to the simplicity of Turkish business legislation applicable to Syrian business
people and pre-existing business relations, Turkey has become a commercial hub for the
Syrian business diaspora. The number of companies established with joint Syrian capital
has multiplied almost 40-fold since 2011 and trade with Syria in border cities like
Gaziantep, Mersin and Hatay far exceeds the 2010 levels (Özpinar et al. 2015; Abboud
2017). Export revenues of these cities have significantly increased due to the fact that
many Turkey-based Syrian firms have counterparts in Syria. Out of the 363 foreign-
3owned companies which were created in Turkey in January 2014, 96 were Syrian-owned
(The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey-TOBB, 2015). The
Gaziantep-based Syrian Economic Forum reported that since 2011, Syrians have invested
nearly 334 million USD into 6,033 new formal companies in Turkey (Uçak and Ramadan
2017), constantly scoring at the top of the list of foreign founders of new companies since
2013 (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey- TOBB, 2017). In 2017,
Syrians were poised to establish over 2,000 additional new companies in Turkey, with
around 90 million USD of Syrian capital (TOBB, 2017). According to the recent report
published by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV 2018),
Syrians established 7,243 businesses in the last seven years in Turkey. Only in the first
half of 2018, 778 businesses were established by Syrians. 
Syrian capital flow to Turkey provides glimpses into the understanding of
reception policies and the governance of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Bélanger and
Saraçoğlu (2018:2) highlight the state-market convergence in shaping Turkey’s policy
towards the Syrian refugees. They argue that “the legal terms and conditions of the
Turkish state’s temporary protection regime, the state’s ad hoc leniency towards the use
of refugee labour in the informal sector and the disciplinary effects of the state’s
regulations have formed the basis of the state-capital nexus in the governance of Syrian
refugees and created a favourable context for the Turkish business and capital owners to
take advantage of the Syrian refugees”. Due to high number of Syrian refugee numbers in
Turkey - the registered number as of June 2020 is 3,585,198
(data2/unchrc.org/en/situations/Syria/location/113), hence the increasing labour force,
Turkey has been able to attract further foreign investment, especially to border regions.
4Despite such increase in capital flows in the Turkish border cities, it has been reported
however that bigger opportunities have been missed in terms of attracting Syrian
investments in Turkey (Oytun 2015:18). The Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, though
speculative, maintained that around 25 billion dollars have been transferred to Europe
through Greek Cypriot banks (ibid.). Syrian entrepreneurs have also been creating
employment in Turkey. On average, they employ 9.4 people and report that most of their
employees were previously working in the informal sector. Over half (55 per cent) of
SMEs, stated as well that they will hire additional employees over the coming year (8.2
on average) (Uçak et al. 2017).
Most of the research on the Syrian displacement has not contributed a great deal
to our understanding of diaspora business activity in the host countries. Following
Brubaker (2015:12), we use the term diaspora as “a category of practice, which is used to
make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to
appeal to loyalties”. As the dependency of the Turkish economy on foreign inflows has
consistently increased, the Turkish state saw displaced Syrian capital as a way to meet the
rapidly increasing need for foreign inflows to finance the economy, and designed legal
and institutional arrangements of the governance of the Syrian refugees in favour of
capital owners. Turkey has consequently benefited from a large amount of cash injections
from the establishment of Syrian companies, as well as joint ventures with local partners.
At the same time, however, the Syrian business diaspora has sought to decrease its
dependence on Turkey’s market and political conditions through expanding their
transnational opportunities and maintaining businesses within multiple fields that span
borders. Increasing transnationalisation of economic activities of the Syrian business
5people in Turkey and the proliferation of transnational economic spaces, practices and
opportunities delineate hence the Syrian capital in Turkey as a ‘fluid’ one, ready to move
away in case of major crises. By revealing this dimension of the diaspora business in the
host countries, we aim to enlarge the discussion on diasporic business communities and
contribute to literature on diaspora entrepreneurs in the course of the protracted conflict. 
Also, thus far, there have been relevant studies on the role that the diaspora
entrepreneurship plays on the development of the home countries. For instance,
Chrysostome (2014) Newland and Tanaka (2010) and Minto-Coy (2016) analysed their
contribution to the socio-economic development of the home country. Elo (2015, 2016
studied the impact of diaspora networks on international business in the home country
and suggested a typology of diaspora entrepreneurship. Brinkerhoff (2016) scrutinised
the positive role of diasporas to promote institutional reforms in the countries of origin.
However, there is still not much study on how the diaspora business people can assist in
the process of conflict resolution while the conflict is still going on in their home
countries. The second aim of our paper hence is to assess the capacity and/or the
willingness of the Syrian business people to organize themselves as an interest group in
Turkey with the aim to assist the process of conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction in Syria through remittances, philanthropy work and participation in peace
negotiations. As such, we would like to expand existing knowledge on the ways in which
diaspora entrepreneurs can assist in the resolution of an on-going conflict in home
countries. Finally, a limited amount of research on the
Syrian business people mostly depicts them as a fixed entity, and focuses on their impact
on the host countries’ economy (Özpinar and et al., 2015; Errighi and Griesse 2016). This
6body of research tends to focus on the Syrian business migrants’ ethnic identity and
assumes a great deal of ethnocultural incorporation and of fixed practices among them in
a given context. Our empirical evidence reveals that while the Syrian business diaspora in
Turkey is evolving itself into the transnational business community, it also forms new
hybrid business practices in the host country. Our paper, therefore, seeks to contribute
also to the flourishing literature on multiple spatial and temporal contexts in the analysis
of diaspora business activity in which hybrid practices are formed in the host countries,
as well. 
Fieldwork and Methodology
In order to reach our objectives detailed in the introduction of this paper, and
observe closely the real-life and material consequences of the Syrian capital flight to
Turkey revealed above, in 2018-2019 we conducted an extensive fieldwork in Istanbul,
Adana, Mersin, Hatay, Gaziantep and Bursa. Trade with Syria in the border cities like
Gaziantep, Mersin and Hatay far exceeds their pre-war levels. While before the war,
Turkey’s western regions and the Istanbul’s area had the largest share of total exports to
Syria, after the war, the share of the southern regions of Turkey has increased drastically
from 20 per cent to 60 per cent (Aita 2017). For example, after having decreased from
98million USD in 2011 to 63million USD in 2012, Gaziantep’s export to Syria increased
by 467 per cent to 354million USD in 2013 (Data obtained from Gaziantep Chamber of
Industry: http://gso.org.tr/). The majority of these exports are made up of basic consumer
goods for which production in Syria is halted or cut back because of the war. Export
revenues of these cities have significantly increased as many Turkey-based Syrian firms
provided basic consumer goods through their counterparts in Syria (Karasapan 2016). 
7Our fieldwork was divided into four phases between August 2018 and February
2019. We conducted the first part of the fieldwork in August in Istanbul, the second part
between September 16 and September 22 in Adana, Mersin, Hatay, and Gaziantep, the
third phase in October 18-24 in Bursa and the fourth phase in December 2018-February
2019 in Istanbul once again. 
These cities were selected since they host the majority of the Syrian
business community. Amongst them, Istanbul hosts the general Syrian trade and
tourism business, and Syrian restaurants, bakeries, sweet shops and jewellery
stores have revived the socio-economic life in Fatih and Aksaray (FIGURE I). In
Gaziantep, the Syrian businesses are predominantly active in textile, shoe, soap
and food factories. The Syrian business has revived the dormant sectors such as
the olive oil soap and woman shoe production, while the poorer Syrian refugees
have provided cheap labour for the host business community in Gaziantep
(Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of Dünya Economy Newspaper in Gaziantep,
September 2018). Gaziantep is about to open the 6th organized industrial zone in
the city, indicating the increased industrial activity. Mersin is the main centre of
Syrian export and import activity in Turkey, since it also enjoys being the location
where raw materials reach the south of Turkey from other countries (FIGURE II). In
Mersin, the Syrian imports and exports have contributed to the overall
international trade volume of
8Turkey(https://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/presscenter/pressreleas
es/2019/11/mersin-suriyeli.html).
Being one of the most important textile centres of Turkey, Bursa has
mainly attracted textile industry investment (especially baby and children textile)
from Syria. Relevant Syrian investments have also been made in more rural and
peripheral areas of Turkey, such as Kadirli where the Sharabati Denim, one of the
biggest fabric manufacturers in the Middle East, has built a huge denim factory
(FIGURE III) and Maras where the Syrian businessman Mahmoud Zakrit has
established an important dairy factory. These initiatives have also been possible
thanks to the generous grants offered by TKDK (the Agricultural and Rural
Development Support Institution in Turkey) to investors willing to operate in
Turkey’s peripheral areas.  
We conducted a total of 35 individual semi-structured in-depth interviews with
Syrian business people who have started a business with a capital no less than 100,000
USD, civil society representatives and local chamber of commerce officials. In addition,
we had many informal conversations with local Turkish and Syrian communities in the
cities we visited. All of our business people interviewees were male, and the majority of
them had a university level education. About two-thirds of our interviewees were from
Aleppo (the rest was from Idlib, Afrin, Hama, Darayya and we had only one interviewee
from Damascus). They are currently active in manufacturing, textile, energy and
restaurant sectors in Turkey. According to the editor in chief of Dünya newspaper in
Gaziantep who was one of our interviewees, the Syrian business community is generally
9viewed by the host communities in the cities we visited in Turkey as educated, cultured
and experienced people, with advanced business networks in the Middle East. They are
considered to have hence revitalized the business environment in the small cities, which
were not particularly internationalized before.
In order to recruit participants, we used a snowballing technique, asking each
interviewee to recommend others who could offer additional insights. All participants
were interviewed on a voluntary basis. The length of the interviews ranged from 45 to 60
minutes. The interviews were transcribed and coded using eight research questions as
organizing themes such as the challenges faced by Syrian business people to start a
business and engage commercial activities in Turkey; how they have been overcoming
them; and the relation of Syrian business people with the host business community in
Turkey.
Our fieldwork comprised of observations of real-life situations such as chatting
over a coffee, having lunch/ dinner together, observing our respondents in their working
environment (businesses), attending business meetings etc. and semi-structured
interviews with Syrian business people, civil society representatives and local chamber of
commerce officials. We were particularly interested in to find out whether there are any
organizations to represent their economic and political interests in Turkey, and if yes,
whether they are willing to join such organizations. Our interviews also sought answers
to how the Syrian business people see the current political discussions about the Syrian
refugees in Turkey, and how these discussions affect their business strategies in Turkey
and beyond. We were curious to discover the Syrian business people’s relations with
other groups of Syrian refugees and whether they are involved in public efforts on
10
organizing relief and other humanitarian needs of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. We also
wanted to understand which factors shape the future plans of Syrian business people in
Turkey, whether they have transnational ties with the exiled Syrian business people based
in the region. Additionally, we aimed to learn how the Syrian business community assess
the activities of the Syrian Business Forum in Turkey, whether they are affiliated with
any political forces, such as Syrian National Council or Syrian National Coalition and
whether they provide financial and other support to political parties/organizations, social
movements or civil society organizations. Finally, we sought answers to how the Syrian
business people envision the post-conflict Syria and whether they are willing to be part of
post-conflict reconstruction and development processes in Syria.
During our interviews, we encouraged informants to openly share what they
thought was important for them regarding their host country and their diaspora status in
doing business in order for us to grasp the genuine contribution of the Syrian capital and
business people in Turkey. Our semi-structured interviews aimed to capture the role of
the Syrian capital in the emergence and articulation of interconnected economic and
political spaces and practices in Turkey and beyond. We, first wanted to discuss the
challenges our interviewees have experienced while doing business in Turkey as Syrians
and their views on the effects of the Syrian capital flight in the Turkish economy due to
the expansion of the increased demand for labour, the cash injections through the
establishment of new companies, as well as joint ventures with local partners. Second,
our questions aimed to scrutinise the capacity of the Syrian business community to
organize themselves as an interest group regarding their economic interests and legal
rights as well as their ability and/or willingness to exert the economic, political and socio-
11
cultural influence on other groups of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Finally, our questions
sought to explore the possible engagement of Syrian business diaspora in assisting the
process of conflict resolution and (post-) conflict reconstruction process in Syria, with a
focus on remittances, philanthropy work and participation in peace processes etc. During
the interview, we also asked about the specific context of each city. We worked with
Arabic-Turkish interpreters in each city, although various interviews were also conducted
in English and Turkish (respectively working and native languages of the authors), as
some Syrian business people have become fluent in Turkish by now. 
In the following section we will look into the convergence of the interests of the
host state and of the displaced capital owners and analyse the characteristics of the Syrian
capital and emerging Syrian business diaspora in Turkey within the context of the
shifting political economy that displacement generates. The fourth section examines the
capacity and/or willingness of the Syrian business people to organize themselves as an
interest group regarding their political and economic interests in Turkey, and to assist the
process of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Syria with a focus on
remittances, philanthropy work and participation in peace negotiations. Since Syrian
entrepreneurs continue employing traditional business practices in Turkey and a
considerable amount of them have become Turkish citizens together with their extended
families, and the remaining have already applied for the Turkish citizenship, the last
section scrutinizes the degree to which the Syrian business people have developed a
hybrid identity. Here, we suggest that increasing transnationalisation of the Syrian
business diaspora in Turkey has developed in parallel to the formation of a hybrid Syrian
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business community. This hybridisation, we argue, has the potential to help form a
hyphenated Syrian-Turkish identity in the near future.
The Shifting Political Economy of Displacement
The Syrian capital in Turkey well reflects the shifting political economy dynamics
that displacement creates. In her research on the displacement economies in the southern
Africa, Hammar (2014: 3) introduces the compelling paradoxes of displacement in which
“opening occurring as well as closures; dislocation and movement at the same time as
confinement and stuckness; creation as well as destruction; wealth accumulation
alongside impoverishment.” In her analysis, Hammar mainly highlights the changing
forms and dynamics of accumulation, distribution and exchange in times of crisis and
displacement. In the case of the Syrian capital flight, displacement has created new
opportunities and articulated an interconnected transnational economic spaces and
practices by altering the patterns of the production and distribution. 
The expansion of transnational flows of capital across borders and boundaries has
thus far flourished into an immense body of work on transnational diaspora business in
various disciplines (Portes et al. 2002; Riddle et al. 2010; Round et al.2008). Yet, the
literature on the transnational economic practices of newly emerging refugee diasporas in
the Global South is still very limited (Mencütek 2020). Our paper contributes therefore to
this emerging empirical literature on the economic activities of business diaspora in the
host countries of Global South by focusing on the Syrian capital flight funnelled to
Turkey. Focusing on the multi-sited economic networks of the Syrian businessmen
diaspora further challenges the dualistic thinking that conceptualizes migration “in linear
13
terms, starting with migrant leaving a sending state, going through their arriving in a
host-state, and ending with their integration or assimilation in a host-state” (Koinova
2018: 1259). Many of the works on the activities of migrants mostly highlights the
relationship between transnationalism and integration to analyze whether involvement in
transnational activities (political, social, cultural and/or economic) limit or accelerate the
integration processes of the migrants in their host countries (Portes et al. 2002, Dekker
and Siegel 2013; Tsuda 2012, Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Simsek 2018). These studies
mostly use transnationalism as migrant’s origin country engagement to assess the
correlation between sustaining ties with the home country and integration in the host
country. Portes et al (2002:6) argue that “to the extent that such (transnational economic)
activities are successful, they may allow immigrants to fulfill their economic targets
without undergoing a protracted process of acculturation.” (Emphasis is ours),
The analysis on the emergence of transnational economic spaces adds to the
ongoing discussion on resisting and surviving strategies of conflict-generated business
diaspora in host-homeland contexts. Bash et al. (2005:8) defines transnationalism as
processes to analyse how immigrants build social fields that span borders, as well as “to
see the ways transmigrants are transformed by their transnational practices and how these
practices affect the nation-states of the transmigrants’ origin and settlement.” This
definition enables us to challenge the portrayal of diaspora communities as victims or
passive actors, and to recognize their capacity to influence on multiple spatial and
temporal contexts. In our case, we argue that the changes in accumulation, production
and distribution patterns of Turkey-based Syrian business people strengthen their
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resisting power in a spatial and temporal limbo where uncertainties prevail regarding
political and legal status.
Cultivating transnational practices has been incorporating the Syrian business
diaspora into different networks beyond home-states and host-states. It is our
understanding that Syrian business diaspora has sought to decrease its dependence on
Turkey’s market and political conditions through expanding their transnational
opportunities and maintaining businesses within multiple fields that span borders.
Increasing transnationalisation of economic activities of the Syrian business people in
Turkey and the proliferation of transnational economic spaces, practices and
opportunities delineate hence the Syrian capital in Turkey as a ‘fluid’ one, ready to move
away in case of major crises.
While based in Turkey, many of our interviewees talked about their dense and
active networks that cross geographic, political, economic and cultural borders of nation
states. The two-thirds of our interviewees mentioned that they continue keeping their
production facilities running in Syria, albeit at a limited scale. They also have
commercial ties with the wider Middle Eastern, European and African countries through
goods export and import of capitals. Thirty-nine per cent of Syrian SMEs have reported
regional trade as the primary opportunity in Turkey, followed by serving the Syrian
refugee market and the Turkish market, at 23 per cent each (Uçak et al. 2017). Syrian
business people especially from Aleppo had many networks and relationships with the
other Arab countries in the Middle East. They have hence been creating further regional
trade links including Turkish border cities.
One of our interviewees in Gaziantep said that all the packaging for the Syrian
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products now have a ‘Made in Turkey’ label which is a guarantee of quality for their
products abroad. He continued:
“‘Made in Turkey’ label makes our products more competitive around the world.
After having shifted our production to Turkey, we started going to the
international fairs and found new customers in Europe as well as in the Middle
East.”
On the other hand, none of our interviewees indicated that they primarily target
the Turkish market for their products. Syrian products produced in Turkey are usually
destined to the Middle East countries and some European countries, too. They are also
largely intended for the sizable Syrian community living now in Turkey. Syrian products
hence have not created a tangible competition to local Turkish products.
Syrian capital flight constitutes spatial projects that create innovation,
competitiveness and economic development in their new environment, and beyond
(Brinkerhoff 2016; Riddle et al 2010). Stoyanov et al. (2018:238) argue that “the
observed ability of transnational economic actors to control and manipulate the host
country environment reveals an important deviation from the established understanding
that foreign nationals are in an unfavorable position.” In the Turkish context, one can
argue that the survival character and the economic success of the Syrian business people
resonate continuities in the Turkish public regarding ‘foreignness’ in economic realm. In
the Ottoman Empire, the three non-Muslim communities – Greek Orthodox, Armenian
and Jewish – and foreigners who enjoyed privileges through capitulation agreements had
higher participation rates in commerce related activities and finance (Buğra 1994).
According to the industry census in the early 1910s, around 80 per cent of the single-
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proprietor firms were owned by non-Muslim minorities (Yamak 2006:209). Following
the defeat in the Balkan Wars, destroying the prominent position of ‘foreign’ elements in
economy became the major policy of the Ottoman and later Turkish governments’ in the
project of creating a national economy (Ağır and Artunç 2019). As Elo and Minto Coy
(2019: vii) suggest, therefore, despite their highly significant contributions, migrant
businesses face challenges and difficulties that stem from their ethnic identity in Turkey
as elsewhere. 
The capacity of the Syrian business people to organize themselves as an interest
group: The ‘Shy Diaspora’
There is a vast literature on conflict generated diaspora mobilization in the host
and origin countries during the process of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction (Kleist
2008; Koinova 2011; Brinkerhoff 2009; Carling, Erdal and Horst 2012). Scholarship on
diaspora mobilization has traditionally analysed diasporas as ‘peace-makers’ or `peace-
wreckers`, without conceptualizing any in-between or alternative situations (Koinova
2018: 1263; Baser and Swain, 2008). In recent years, however, there has been a growing
scholarship challenging this dichotomous thinking and introducing multiple spatial and
temporal contexts in the analysis of the factors that shape diaspora engagement in home
and host-states, such as multi-sited embeddedness and durability of conflicts (Koinova
2017; Horst 2018; Mavroudi 2018). Refugees, just like labour migrants, are not static, nor
are they locked in fixed practices (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 594). Their motivations for
engagement in their host countries or transnationally need to be scrutinised in their
specific circumstances and their transnational business activities, for instance, cannot
simply be explained in terms of globalising capital, time space compression and the
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internationalization of labour (ibid.:591). As Syrett and Keles (2019:61) argue, “much
current theorising has failed to set out how the causal processes for diaspora politicisation
are jointly affected by conditions in the homeland and settlement localities, and state-
centred approaches on their own remain unable to explain variant patterns of diaspora
mobilisation across all host-homeland contexts.” 
Our fieldwork shows that host-homeland engagement of the Syrian business
diaspora is largely shaped by the mixed embeddedness of actors in broader contexts,
including political and economic circumstances of settlement and homeland places. In
relation to host-land engagement, we found that that Syrian business people engage in
fewer host-land political mobilization activities. This may be due to both the political
pressure of the rising authoritarianism in Turkey and alleged Assad regime’s or ISIS
assassinations of prominent Syrian political opponents, intellectuals, activists and
journalists in Turkey. Furthermore, it is a very well-known fact that as long as refugees
are not certain about their legal status, in other words their rights to reside permanently in
the host country, many members of this community will tend to avoid anything that
might jeopardize their status (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 588).
It is our observation that the majority of the Syrian business people preferred not
to participate in any associational activities in politics and/ economics vis-à-vis the
Turkish state regarding their commercial and political interests predominantly for safety,
security and serenity. The low level of associational activity impedes their willingness
and/or capacity to organize as a unified interest group in Turkey. According to the Article
93 of the Turkish Civil code, the real persons of foreign origin who possess the right for
settlement in Turkey may incorporate association or become a member of the existing
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associations. There is consequently no legal obstacle for the Syrian business people to
form an association or become a member of one in Turkey. The Syrian Businessmen
Association (SIAD), the biggest businessmen association based in Gaziantep has only
370 members in Turkey. One of our interviewees, who works at SIAD, highlighted that
since 2015 several problems of the Syrian business people came to the fore, such as the
lack of knowledge about Turkish business laws and the finance regulations in Turkey, as
well as the lack of Turkish language among others. These issues hence led to the
formation of SIAD, although the number of members has remained limited. He explained
the reasons for the low level of associational activities among Syrian businessmen in
Turkey as follows:
“SIAD opposes Assad, but it’s not a problem for us if someone supports Assad.
Many people don’t want to be attached to an association. They have some
businesses in Syria, and they don’t want to hurt that in SIAD.”
Beside weak associational engagement, Turkey-based Syrian businesspeople are not
actively vocal publicly about their own interests as well as the political and economic
rights of the other Syrian refugees in Turkey. According to one of our interviewees who
is in textile business in Bursa:
“People think that talking about politics is a shame. It’s not their country. 95% of 
Syrians in Turkey don’t want Assad, but they could not achieve anything else 
either. They cannot do anything here either. So their mentality is: we could not do 
anything. Let’s save ourselves now. Ya Garip kun edip [You’re a foreigner, so 
behave well].”
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Apart from adopting the strategy of invisibility, hence being ‘shy’, the historical
legacies of state and business relations in the pre-war Syria also hinders Syrian business
people’ interest group activities in Turkey. Following Bashar Assad’s succession in
power in 2000, the Syrian economy underwent liberalization process. During the process
of economic liberalization in Syria, the regime fostered its own capitalist and “aimed to
survive the incremental transition to a partial market economy and since no significant
business venture was possible without regime insiders taking a percentage, regime crony
capitalists developed intimate partnerships with wider elements of the bourgeoisie”
(Hinnebusch 2012:101). In such an environment, more independent bourgeoisie who
were not well connected to the regime was strongly monitored by the regime’s security
apparatus, and alienated in politics. Since 2005, a number of businessmen associations
were established as mostly joint ventures between the regime supported businessmen and
foreign business people (Haddad 2012). Our interviewees echoed pre-war situation as
such:
“The regime has polluted us. It built Baassi [pertaining to the ruling authoritarian Baath
Arab Socialist Party in Syria] in every single one of us. In a dictatorship people lose
morals. They’re scared of each other so it’s very difficult for us to come together
here in Turkey. It’s not our culture to gather to work together.”
Syrian business people operating in Turkey are not used to form business
associations and/or unions, as these [both of them/] were prohibited in Syria under a
dictatorial regime. As most of our interviewees confirmed, because of the lack of such
experience before, and the current tense political and social context in Syria, Syrian
business people are scared of forming any type of association in Turkey. They prefer to
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work individually. One of our interviewees in Gaziantep mentioned:
“The Syrians are not used to such things, like forming independent associations.
Everything was being done by the regime in Syria. There were no counterparts to
etiher TUSIAD or MUSIAD in Syria. We are trying to learn here…”
New trade experiences in Turkey and the interaction with the Turkish business
community have however enabled the formation of Syrian Business People Association
and Syrian Economic Forum in Gaziantep, where Syrian business people gather and talk
about their socio-economic integration, legal rights and problems. The fact that most
Syrian micro-level businesses operated for a long time without any formal registration
and, as a result, did not pay taxes has created resentment within the host community in all
the cities where we have conducted our fieldwork. This was also because the Syrian
business people were not used to operate in the more modernised Turkish business
environment and its more advanced taxing and banking system. The lack of Turkish
language has been a massive challenge for them, as well. The Syrian Economic Forum in
Gaziantep has recently launched campaigns in order to formalize the Syrian businesses
by providing technical assistance to Syrian business owners seeking to understand the
operating environment and help them comply with the regulations. The Forum has also
translated many Turkish investment laws into Arabic. This initiative has helped to
normalize the relationship between the host and the Syrian businesses communities.
Issues concerning homeland politics, such as a possible conflict resolution, a post-
conflict reconstruction, and transnational justice and reconciliation are also carefully
being avoided within the Syrian business circles in Turkey in all the cities we’ve
conducted our research, in order to keep stability and unity within this flourishing
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community. As a conflict-generated diaspora community, Turkey-based Syrian business
people’s main motive has been to survive under greatly uncertain political and economic
conditions. Strengthening their own financial interests by cultivating new transnational
economic linkages has developed as a crisis-driven necessity in a displacement context
while they have tried to ‘save themselves.’ The lack of trust between the displaced Syrian
business people and their home country’s government also impedes Syrian business
diaspora to be a significant actor in the current conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction processes in Syria. As Chrysostome and Nkongolo-Bakenda (2019:29) put
it, “the lack of trust within diaspora communities and between them and their home
country government doesn’t allow them to pool their resources and talents in order to
contribute to the development of their home country at their full potential.” Many of our
interviewees indicated that as long as the Assad regime is in power, it is unimaginable for
them to be part of any reconstruction efforts in Syria.
The Syrian business community in Turkey, on the other hand, seem to have an
impact on their home country in fields such as poverty alleviation through remittances,
philanthropy – concerning Syrian orphans and students both in Turkey and Syria – skills
and technology transfer and business expansion. We particularly observed that there are
increasing efforts among our interviewees to engage in philanthropic activities in areas
under Turkish control in Northern Syria. At the time of writing, the Turkish government
has increased its reconstruction efforts based on a private-public reconstruction model in
North-western Syria. Even though we haven’t delved into this topic in our interviews, it
seems there is a potential for Turkey-based Syrian businesses to be involved in the
Turkish government’s reconstruction plans in northern Syria.
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Towards the formation of a hybrid identity?
Hybridity involves the synthesis of two diverse “forms, styles, or identities”,
which often ensues across national borders as well as across cultural boundaries (Kraidy
2005: 5). It also designates the constitution of new identities that possess a more
“transethnic and transnational character” (Anthias 2001: 625), and hybrids can also be
considered as ‘cultural brokers’ full of discontinuities and ruptures (Bhabha 1994).
According to Bhabha furthermore, hybridity is an ‘in-between’ term referring to a ‘third
space’ and to ambivalence and mimicry. It is a disruptive and productive category (Kalra
et al. 2005: 71) and it is how according to Bhabba (1994) ‘newness enters the world’.
Hybridity is also considered as a progressive citizenly discourse and a
participatory discourse of cultural citizenship (Joseph and Fink 1999) and an idea of
cultural syncretism, rather than the cultural difference solidified by multiculturalism
(Anthias 2001: 621). As opposed to diaspora, it indicates “a process of cultural mixing
where the diasporic arrivals adopt aspects of the host culture and rework, reform and
reconfigure this in production of a new hybrid culture or ‘hybrid identities” (Chambers
1996: 50). In the case of diaspora hybridisation, furthermore “without the certainty of the
nation-state or class-identity for comfort, hybridity becomes a contender for a ‘new
model’ of social possibility that will assert ‘uncertainty’ as its political guide” (Kalra et
al. 2005: 88). However, hybridity has been subjected to criticism as well, accused of
elitism as it has been put forward by ‘a new cultural class of cosmopolitans’ (Pieterse,
2001: 225) as ‘an extension of the free market discourse of late global capitalism’
(Moslund, 2010:12).
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Today, the Syrian business people in Turkey are operating in-between the
traditional and free market economic and trade practices. Next to the modernized Turkish
banking system, they still continue using for instance the old money transfer system-
hawala for their economic transactions, where huge amounts of money are transferred
through personal networks based on mere trust. Some of these exports are officially
registered, but some of them are sold in black. The Turkish state ignores such exchange,
even though it is aware of this, due to large amounts of hot money entrying Turkey.
According to a Syrian businessman in the textile business based in Bursa but originally
from Aleppo, most Syrian business people in Turkey receive the payment for their
exports through the hawalat system. In our interviews, we have found that Syrian
business people have not entirely adopted the cheque-based system as a way of stalling
payments, since they deem that this system takes longer time and its prices are high. They
are also more used to do business by cash, as they are not familiarized with working with
banks, bank checks etc. 
We observe that operating in between the hawala system and the modernised
Turkish business environment brings a hybrid character to the Syrian business
community, next to their transnational character. It is, however, beyond the scope of this
research to determine the degree to which the local Turkish business people have adopted
these traditional Syrian practices so to be able to say something about a reciprocal effect.
Yet, we can eagerly posit that the hybridity of the Syrian business diaspora in Turkey is
not only limited to business practices. Syrian business people who have made huge
investments in Turkey, such as up to a million dollar, have already automatically received
the Turkish citizenship without complying with certain criteria, like having lived in
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Turkey at least five years, knowing Turkish language at sufficient level and so on (Çetin
et al. 2018). Some of our interviewees who acquired Turkish citizenship, for instance, did
not speak any Turkish, although their children did. Other Syrian business people are also
on the path of becoming Turkish citizens together with their extended families. Syrian
business diaspora’s children have been educated in Turkey for years; they speak Turkish
fluently and we have observed that it’s now a common practice among the Syrian
business community to give Turkish names to their children born in Turkey in order to
facilitate their integration into the Turkish majority. Many famous Syrian brands, such as
restaurant and sweet shop chains, have also adopted Turkish names next to the traditional
and well-known Syrian ones once they have established themselves in the Turkish market
(FIGURE IV). 
One should also note that despite there are some issues of xenophobia between
locals and Syrian refugees, both sides have developed mechanisms that have helped to
keep social peace and this demonstrates the capacity of the receiving Turkish and guest
Syrian communities in dealing with social problems (Oytun 2015: 8). By being educated,
coming from upper middle class in Syria and most importantly having the willingness to
amalgamate with the educated Turkish middle class in Turkey, Syrian business people
have indeed facilitated social cohesion between the huge number of relatively
impoverished Syrian refugees and the host community.1
As in September 2019, there have been 450,000 Syrians born in Turkey (Mülteciler
Dernegi 2019). Marriages between Syrians and Turks might cause some issues, but they
have also helped with the integration of refugee communities. Many investors and small
businesses have moved their funding to Turkey. A large portion of the Syrians in Turkey
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are made up of children or youth. Even without proper schooling, these young people
have been learning Turkish. (Oytun 2015: 8).  
All these recent developments may have opened the path to the formation of a Syrian-
Turkish hyphenated identity and/or the formation of the ‘New Turks’ of the future. This
is indeed a possibility that is not seen as extraordinary by several of our Syrian business
interviewees, since they have posited that this would be such a new episode in the
common history of the two nations. In the words of one our interviewees:
“For hundreds of years, we have formed one common identity under the Ottoman
Empire and we have been separated from each other only since a hundred years.
Now, we have been reunited and this is the continuation of history” 1.
The hybridization process of Syrian business diaspora in Turkey, thanks to both
hybrid business practices and the acquisition of Turkish citizenship, indicate that
“hybridity is better conceived of as a process rather than a description” (Virinder et al,
2005: 71). It also reveals, as Wen-Ching argues, that “displacement and mobility are
dynamic processes of ‘reterritorialization’ which imply not only moving ‘out of place’
(Malkki 1995; Den Boer, 2015), but also processes laying out a place as home in
uncertain, insecure and unstable settings” (2018: 391-2).
Conclusion
Our paper sought to unpack the different components among Turkey-based Syrian
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business people in order to be able to analyse the impact of the Syrian capital flow to
Turkey, the degree of their convergence into the Turkish business market and hybridity.
By investigating the Syrian business environment in Turkey, our research also aimed to
explore the wide-ranging factors that impede or accelerate interest group activity of
conflict-generated diaspora groups in their host countries when the civil war in their own
countries continues to evolve.
In our research, we found that while the Syrian capital in Turkey has thus far
created advantages for both the host and the Syrian business community, the Syrian
business activity in Turkey can be best described as transnational. It has been our
understanding that Syrian business people seek to decrease their dependence on Turkey’s
market and political conditions through expanding their transnational opportunities.
That’s why we have delineated the Syrian capital as the ‘fluid capital’ and the Syrian
business diaspora in Turkey as the ‘shy diaspora’. It would of course perhaps still be
hasty to speak of the Syrian business diaspora as a purely ‘transnational community’,
since most of them still live in a state of uncertainty, without a proper passport that can
help them to travel freely. There’s still the problem of not being certain about their legal
status, that is their right to reside permanently in the host country, just like the Bosnian
refugees’ situation in host countries in late 1990s that Al-Ali et al (2001) has articulately
depicted. However, we have observed that the Syrian business community may still have
more transnational tendencies than the rest of the high number of Syrian refugees in
Turkey.
This does not indicate, however, that the Syrian business people in Turkey are
mere economic migrants. It has been clear from our interviews that had there not been a
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1
1 Fieldwork conducted in Adana, September 2018.
war, most of our Syrian business interviewees would not move their businesses and
families to Turkey and give up their life in Syria for a new one in a neighbouring yet
foreign country. Most of our interviewees showed up photos of their houses, factories
and/or businesses destroyed by heavy fighting and bombing and expressed their longing
for the life that they have left behind in Syria. A prominent Syrian businessman in
Gaziantep, who is very well known in Aleppo, even mentioned how he wished he would
not have to meet us as a refugee in Turkey but as a host in his mansion in Aleppo. 
As a conflict generated diaspora community, Turkey-based Syrian business
people’s main motive has also been to survive under greatly uncertain political and
economic conditions. They hence engaged in fewer host-land political mobilization
activities and impeded their willingness and/or capacity to organize as a unified interest
group in Turkey. Also, since a considerable amount of Syrian business people in Turkey
have become Turkish citizens together with their extended families, have learned Turkish
fluently, others are waiting the results of their application while their children have been
growing and/or educating in Turkey, next to their transnational character, Syrian business
people in Turkey demonstrate a degree of hybridity as well. They have also started using
the Turkified versions of the traditional Syrian names/brands for their products and
businesses in Turkey. This hybridisation, we argue, lays out the foundation for the
potential hyphenated Syrian-Turkish and/or the ‘New Turks’ identity that we may see
emerging in the near future.
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